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 Abstract 
 
 
 This study investigates whether U.S. corn merchants can effectively manage the 
overnight price risk of cash corn purchased after the Chicago Board of Trade closes at 1:15 p.m. 
on either the electronic Project A market or in the corn contract traded on the Tokyo Grain 
Exchange.  Three scenarios are examined: 1) overnight hedges; 2) day-to-day hedges; and 3) 
two-day hedges.  Overnight hedges are the least effective of the three scenarios on both markets.  
E*hedging on Project A is more effective than hedging in Tokyo, yet trading of corn futures 
contracts on Project A remains relatively thin and illiquid.  Steps need to be taken to encourage 
more trading of this contract. 
 
 
 
 
*The authors thank Joost Pennings for critical review of this paper. 
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 Hedging Short-term Corn Price Risks  
 In Tokyo versus Chicago’s Project A  
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 Cash corn merchants in the U.S. have long faced the problem of how to manage the 
short-term price risks of grain purchased after the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) futures 
market closes at 1:15 p.m.  In a relatively short time two new markets quickly became available 
enabling these merchants to hedge price risks overnight.  In 1996, the CBOT initiated Project A, 
a mechanism for trading futures contracts electronically at night.  The same corn contract traded 
daytime on the CBOT is traded electronically on Project A.  Prior to Project A, the Tokyo Grain 
Exchange (TGE) in 1993 began trading a corn futures contract designed as an alternative to the 
CBOT corn contract.   
 This paper examines: 1) the daily co-movement and behavior of prices between Chicago 
and Tokyo corn futures markets, and between Chicago daytime and Project A markets, and 
hence, 2) the feasibility and effectiveness of e*hedging overnight cash corn on Project A versus 
hedging in the TGE.  This analysis is useful to domestic corn merchants and to grain importers 
and exporters in managing short-term price risks, and to market arbitragers.  We find that 
e*hedging on Project A shows promise as being reasonably effective, certainly more effective 
than hedging in Tokyo, but that trading on Project A is possibly too thin and illiquid to be a 
viable hedging alternative for many large cash grain merchants. 
 The next section describes the contracts in the Chicago and Tokyo markets, followed by 
Section 3 outlining the framework of analysis, data and methodology.  Section 4 presents the 
results, contrasting Tokyo and Project A outcomes, and the last section contains a discussion of 
the implications and conclusions. 
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 II.  Historical Perspective 
 Traditionally, cash corn merchants in the U.S. have not had a mechanism available for 
hedging grain that is purchased in the afternoon after daytime futures trading on the CBOT is 
closed.  One marketing possibility, of course, is to immediately cash sell or forward cash contract 
this purchased grain, providing there is another buyer available, and hence, pass on the price 
risks to the next party.  Nevertheless, the most commonly used procedure for cash merchants 
who purchase corn in the country is to ‘take protection’, which means that if their cash price bid 
during the day when the CBOT is open is P cents below the nearby futures contract (basis of -P 
cents), then their bids after daytime CBOT closes will be P+X cents below the nearby futures 
(basis of  -[P+X] cents).  They lower their bids for cash corn in the afternoon and overnight, 
giving themselves more ‘protection’ in case prices were to fall before they could sell futures 
contracts the next morning on the CBOT against these cash transactions.  The size of X, termed a 
downside risk premium, varies depending on the merchant’s view of the market, location, 
expectation of overnight price changes, level of risk aversion and competition for acquiring 
grain.  This procedure leaves the grain merchant bearing the cash price risks for a few hours until 
the next morning.  Two hedging alternatives now exist, e*hedging on Project A or hedging in the 
TGE. 
 The first overnight hedging alternative began in 1993 when the TGE launched their corn 
futures contract, with specifications different from the CBOT contract.  Because of the time 
difference between Chicago and Tokyo, a corn merchant in the U.S. can hedge (or cross hedge) 
the price risk on cash corn purchased after the CBOT futures market closes (1:15 p.m.) in the 
Tokyo market during the night.  This corn merchant would not have to wait until the following 
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morning when the CBOT opens (9:30 a.m.) to hedge in the futures market.  A second 
mechanism for hedging these price risks has now been in place since 1996, electronic hedging 
(e*hedging) on Project A at the CBOT.  Trading corn futures contracts on Project A resulted 
partly because the CBOT became concerned that the TGE market was drawing trades away from 
the daytime futures market at the CBOT, and partly because of the move toward electronic 
trading of futures contracts. Recent trading volume of corn futures contracts in these markets is 
as follows. 
Year Chicago (total) Tokyo Project A 
1994 11,529,884 3,053,244 --- 
1995 15,105,147 6,899,593 --- 
1996 19,620,188 16,034,716 134,621 
1997 16,984,951 13,856,595 160,737 
1998 15,795,493 7,267,043 184,495 
 
 Clearly, the Tokyo futures contract grew very rapidly in trading volume in its short 
history, reaching a volume of just 3 million fewer contracts than the Chicago contract by 1997, 
but then diminishing considerably in 1998.  Interestingly, the trend in both markets is identical, 
peaking in 1996, then declining.1  In contrast, the volume of corn futures contracts on electronic 
Project A is relatively quite small, yet increasing.  It now is only about 1% of the CBOT corn 
trading volume. 
                                                 
 1 The Tokyo contract is 21% smaller in size than the Chicago corn contract. 
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 The corn contract traded electronically on Project A is specified identically to the 
contract traded by open outcry during the day on the CBOT.  Table 1 lists the contract 
specifications of this corn futures contract traded in Chicago and the corn futures contract traded 
on the TGE in Tokyo.  There are several differences between the contracts, including size, 
deliverable grade, tick size, price limits, contract months, currency and last day of trading.  Most 
notable is that the Chicago market trades continuously from when the market opens until closing 
time.  In contrast, the Tokyo market is not open continuously, but it has at least four different 
trading sessions during the day.  However, this difference does not impact this analysis as it is 
assumed all trades are conducted at either the opening or closing times for the day for both 
markets.  Nevertheless, the different contract specifications may impact individual market 
participants. 
 
 III.  Framework of Analysis, Data and Methodology 
Time Line  
 Tokyo is 15 hours ahead of Chicago (standard time).  Hence, when the Chicago market 
closes at 1:15 p.m., it is 4:15 a.m. the next morning in Tokyo (see Figure 1).  The Tokyo 
exchange opens 4 hours and 45 minutes after the Chicago market closes.  This creates a gap 
when neither market is open.  Similarly, the last trading session in Tokyo closes at 4:00 p.m. 
(Tokyo time), which corresponds to 1:00 a.m. in Chicago the same day.  The market in Chicago 
will not open for another 8 ½ hours, creating another time gap when neither market is open.  
However, the corn contract on Project A begins trading at 9:00 p.m. and closes the next morning 
at 4:30 a.m., reducing this second time gap.  In a strict time line, after daytime trading on the 
CBOT closes, the Tokyo exchange opens before Project A begins trading, and Tokyo also closes 
earlier than does the corn contract on Project A.  
  
5
 This research investigates if a merchant in Chicago were to purchase cash corn in the 
afternoon in the U.S., could the merchant effectively hedge this position in the Tokyo Grain 
Exchange, or on Project A, before the Chicago daytime market opens the next morning?  Since 
cash grain merchants may need to hold their cash grain, and subsequently its hedge, longer than 
overnight, due to various cash marketing constraints and illiquidity, this study also extends the 
time horizon.  So, the following three different hedging scenarios are analyzed: 1) overnight 
hedge; 2) day-to-day hedge; and 3) a two-day hedge.2  Each is defined next.3 
Overnight Hedge 
 This study does not concern itself with basis risks.  The goal is to analyze the general 
behavior and co-movement of prices between futures exchanges.  Hence, for the overnight hedge 
it is assumed that the merchant buys cash corn at the closing daytime price of the nearby contract 
on the CBOT on day t and sells it at the opening CBOT daytime price of the same contract the 
next morning, day t+1.4  During this time of holding cash grain the merchant hedges this position 
on the TGE by selling a corn futures contract at the opening TGE price on day t+1 and 
liquidating this position at the closing TGE price on the same day, day t+1.5  Both of these 
                                                 
 2 See Leuthold, Junkus and Cordier, pp. 145-148 for descriptions of common grain 
merchant hedges. 
 3 These types of hedges are termed operational hedges, meaning they are held for only a 
short time to facilitate merchandising.  The hedge is a temporary substitute for subsequent cash 
market transactions (Leuthold, Junkus, Cordier, p. 145; Working). 
 4 Technically, including actual cash prices and a basis would not change the relative 
results of this study, but only complicate the comparisons and analysis.  The following hedging 
effectiveness results may be upward biased, but only slightly since Norvell and Leuthold report 
hedging ratios of 0.94 for Illinois corn producers, meaning cash and futures prices are highly 
positively correlated.  Also, this study is not concerned with optimal hedge ratios, presuming all 
hedges are on a bushel-for-bushel basis. 
 5 Discussion relative to Project A follows. 
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futures trades on the TGE are conducted between the times of the cash transactions.  The 
following table shows this scenario. 
   
Overnight Hedge 
Chicago-Cash TGE-Futures 
BUY at the close, day t SELL at the open, day t+1 
SELL at the open, day t+1  BUY at the close, day t+1 
 
Day-to-Day Hedge 
 For practical cash grain merchandising reasons (e.g., inability to immediately move the 
cash grain purchased overnight), the relative price behavior and co-movements in the two 
markets over longer periods is also analyzed.  For the second scenario cash grain and the 
corresponding hedge are both held for one day.  That is, the corn merchant again buys cash corn 
at the closing price of the nearby contract on the CBOT on day t, the same action as in the first 
scenario.  This time the merchant holds the grain 24 hours before selling it at the close on day 
t+1.  The merchant sells corn futures on the TGE at the opening price of day t+1 and sells these 
contracts at the opening price of day t+2.  The holding of these futures contracts in Tokyo is 
again in between the buy and sell times of the cash grain in the U.S.  The following table shows 
this scenario. 
Day-to-Day Hedge 
 
Chicago-Cash TGE-Futures 
BUY at the close, day t SELL at the open, day t+1 
SELL at the close, day t+1  BUY at the open, day t+2 
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Two-Day Hedge 
 For the two-day hedge, it is assumed that the corn merchant in the U.S. again buys corn at 
the closing daytime price of the CBOT on day t.  This cash grain is held until the opening 
daytime price of the CBOT on day t+2.  Again, a hedge is placed by selling futures contracts on 
the TGE at the opening price on day t+1 (same as the above two scenarios), but this time the 
hedge is held until the closing price of day t+2.  As before, the time period of holding the hedge 
in Tokyo is in between the buy and sell times for cash grain in Chicago.  The following table 
shows this scenario. 
 
Two-Day Hedge 
 
Chicago-Cash TGE-Futures 
BUY at the close, day t  SELL at the open, day t+1 
SELL at the open, day t+2  BUY at the close, day t+2 
 
   
 The identical three scenarios are also created using the electronic Project A opening and 
closing price data instead of Tokyo Grain Exchange data.  Notation remains the same as above 
because Project A data are recorded relative to its closing time, which for these scenarios occurs 
at 4:30 a.m. on day t+1.6   As with the TGE trades, all futures trades conducted on Project A 
occur in between the two cash transactions. 
Data 
 The data used for this study are the daily opening and closing prices on the CBOT and 
TGE for the years 1994-1998, and Project A for 1996-1998.  The nearby futures contract for 
TGE and Project A is selected for each hedge, except prices during the delivery or maturity 
                                                 
 6 Technically, settlement for Project A trades occurs at the settlement price for the day-
traded contracts on the CBOT, determined in the afternoon on the same day Project A closes.  
Nevertheless, of concern here is the closing price on Project A, not its settlement price. 
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month of the contract are not used.  Interestingly, in the Tokyo corn futures market the nearby 
contract typically has the smallest open interest, and subsequent more distant contracts have 
progressively larger open interest, just the opposite to the structure of open interest usually 
observed in Chicago.  Consequently, we repeat our analysis using a distant, more liquid, contract 
rather than the nearby futures contract for Tokyo (cash transaction prices remain the same).  The 
rule followed in this case is to select that TGE corn contract with the largest open interest, which 
averages 10 months forward. 
 Special care is taken in managing the data.  Specifically, holidays and other market 
events are different in the two markets.  So, data management ensured that if a futures position 
began using one delivery month, this trade was liquidated using the same delivery month.  Also, 
to avoid the effect of holidays, care was taken to ensure that if a transaction occurred in one 
country, the offsetting transaction could be completed as specified in the above scenarios in the 
other country without interruption.  If there was a holiday in one country within the trading 
period, that observation was deleted. 
Methodology 
 The methodological procedures followed in this study are straight forward.  We calculate 
the mean cash price changes in Chicago and the corresponding futures prices changes along with 
their standard deviations for each hedging scenario and market described above, and summarize 
these statistics annually as well as for the total sample.  We examine the co-movement of cash 
and futures prices through cointegration tests, but for a quantitative measure of co-movement we 
also compute the correlation coefficient between each of these matched cash and futures price 
series (simulated hedges), and test for the significance of these coefficients.7  We follow the 
                                                 
 7 Cointegration implies that there is a long-term linear equilibrium between the two 
markets and any disruptions are due to temporary forces. 
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standard cointegration testing procedures, such as those outlined in Davidson and Mackinnon, 
Chapter 20. 
 The typical procedure in the literature for demonstrating the effectiveness of simple 
hedges is to utilize the R2 coefficient taken from regressing the cash price change on the futures 
price change (Ederington; Leuthold, Junkus and Cordier, pp. 90-101).  This coefficient, coming 
from the standard hedge ratio regression, shows the reduction in variance as a proportion of total 
variance that results from maintaining a hedged position rather than an unhedged position.  A 
‘perfect’ hedge would have an R2 of nearly 1.0. 
 Finally, to see the distribution of the hedging results in detail, we report the percent of all 
the final hedge outcomes falling into 1-cent increments, both positive and negative.  This 
distribution, which shows the range of profits and losses occurring from individual hedges, 
demonstrates the benefits and risks resulting from hedging in Project A and TGE. 
 
 IV.  Results 
Price Relationships  
 Table 2 shows for the hedges utilizing the nearby corn futures contract in Tokyo: 1) the 
number of observations, 2) mean cash and futures price change and standard deviation in 
cents/bushel for each market, 3) the correlation coefficient between the cash and futures price 
changes in the two markets, and 4) the R2 from regressing the Chicago cash price change on the 
Tokyo futures price change.  Each of these statistics is presented by hedging scenario and 
individual year, then totaled over the years.  Table 3 shows the same summary statistics when 
using a distant Tokyo corn futures contract instead of the nearby contract.  The price of corn on 
the TGE in yen/1,000 kilograms was converted to dollars/bushel at the exchange rate on the day 
of the trade. 
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 First, in Table 2 the means of the price changes are small, with only one mean exceeding 
one cent/bushel in absolute value (Chicago, two day, 1996).  No mean price change is 
significantly different from zero, and the standard deviations appear relatively large.  That is, 
there is a wide range of short-term price changes in both markets, but they average near zero.  
Most of the paired means are of the same sign, meaning prices in general change in the same 
direction.  The overall 5-year means are all very close to zero.  One must interpret these results 
with caution because they are averages of a large set of observations, and most important for a 
hedger is how closely do the prices move together on each trade, not the movement on the 
average trade.  This topic will be addressed shortly. 
 All of the correlation coefficients are positive, and all but two are significantly different 
from zero.8  Regardless of scenario, correlation coefficients decrease from 1994 to 1995, then 
increase sharply for the next two years, but deceased again in 1998 relative to 1997.  It is not 
clear from these data why CBOT and TGE corn futures markets move more closely together in 
1996 and 1997 than in other years.  The overnight correlations are the lowest, while the day-to-
day correlations are the largest (except for 1998), with the day-to-day and two-day correlations 
being substantially larger than the overnight coefficients.  The tests for cointegration over the 
whole sample period also show that the paired series are in fact cointegrated, adding to the 
notion that these cash and futures prices tend to move together in the long run.9 
 The R2s show the same pattern as that just described for the correlation coefficients. 
These R2 coefficients are quite low, with the largest being 0.38.  A substantial proportion of the 
                                                 
 8 The critical levels for the Pearson’s product-moment t-ratios are 1.645 for 95% and 
1.282 for 90%. 
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cash price variation is not explained by, or covered by, the futures price in the TGE.  That is, 
these hedges are not very effective for managing price risks, with overnight hedging being the 
particularly poor.  Nevertheless, recall that these regressions were performed on price changes, 
which typically have lower R2 coefficients than do regressions in price levels.  The improved 
hedging effectiveness for the one- and two-day relative to overnight hedges is consistent with 
results shown by Castelino and Gebbert.  There is a time dimension to hedging effectiveness 
because of decreasing noise in the data. 
 Three alternative currency conversions were used in analyzing the trading scenarios.  The 
first was to convert yen to dollars at the exchange rate on the day of the trade.  The second 
alternative converted the yen to dollars at the same exchange rate on day the hedge was placed as 
on the day the hedge was lifted.  That is, there was no variation in the exchange rate during the 
trade.  This scenario fits large firms who have accounts in both countries and do not need to 
convert currencies every day.  Many of the means changed under this second currency exchange 
procedure relative to the first one, but not perceptively.  The basic results remain the same, and 
the correlation coefficients were nearly identical to those shown in Table 2. 
 The third alternative was to correlate the Chicago cash price change in dollars to the 
Tokyo futures price change in yen during the trade without any currency conversion.  Again, the 
correlation coefficients are nearly identical to those in Table 2.  Hence, variations in the 
treatment of exchange rates had no substantial effect on the analysis performed in this study. 
 Table 3 shows similar summary statistics as Table 2, but this time using distant futures 
contracts in Tokyo rather than a nearby contract.  The pattern of results is very similar between 
                                                                                                                                                             
 9 The matched cash and futures price series utilizing Project A and distant TGE corn 
futures contracts are also cointegrated.  Critical values for these tests were obtained from 
Davidson and Mackinnon.  
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the two tables.  First, the same proportion as in Table 2 of paired mean price changes have the 
same sign.  Nevertheless, all means are one cent or less in absolute value, and none is 
significantly different from zero.  Second, most, but not all, of the correlation and R2 coefficients 
are larger than their corresponding coefficient in Table 2.  All but one of the correlation 
coefficients are significantly different from zero.  Third, the correlation and R2 statistics for the 
full 5 years are nearly identical between the two tables.  Hence, although there is a slight 
tendency for closer co-movement of prices when utilizing distant rather than nearby corn 
contracts in Tokyo, the results are not perceptibly different, and the basic implications remain the 
same. 
 Table 4 shows the same summary statistics between CBOT daytime and Project A 
electronic nighttime prices, and clearly the co-movement of cash and futures prices is much 
closer in this case than when examining Tokyo prices.  The means remain small and not 
significantly different from zero.  However, the correlation and R2 coefficients are much higher 
than those shown in Tables 2 and 3, and the signs of the mean price changes are more in 
accordance with each other.10  While the correlation coefficients for the full-sample Tokyo 
results range from 0.21 to 0.54, the full-sample Project A coefficients range from 0.58 to 0.89.  
The R2 coefficients for Project A for the one- and two-day hedges are 0.79, indicating the 
potential for highly effective e*hedges.  
Hedging Results 
 Since the hedges simulated in this study are ‘operational hedges’, those held for only a 
short time, a cash grain merchant would expect, and desire, a hedge where the net profit or loss 
                                                 
 10 Correlation coefficients between Project A and Tokyo approximate those between 
Chicago daytime prices and Tokyo. 
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from the combined cash and futures positions would approximate zero.  Assuming opposite 
positions in the cash and futures markets, results from Tables 2, 3, and 4 show no full-sample net 
mean from hedging exceeding one-quarter cent in absolute value.  All are technically zero.  For 
individual years, only in the case of distant Tokyo contracts for 1996 do the combined cash and 
futures positions exceed 1-cent per bushel, and this occurs for all three scenarios.  Thus, for the 
merchant buying grain and hedging every day, both Project A and TGE futures markets will 
offset virtually all the cash price risks on average.  However, involvement in these markets every 
day is unlikely for many merchants. 
 Table 5 presents the percent of net profit and losses from all simulated hedges in 1-cent 
intervals.  These distributions provide more detail about the nature of the results from combined 
cash and futures positions.  For Tokyo, these results assume, as previously, that yen are 
converted to dollars each day.  No perceptible difference occurred if the exchange rate was 
constant for each trade. 
 Examining Tokyo results first, there appears to be a fairly wide distribution to the 
individual hedge outcomes.  And, the distributions are wider and flatter the longer the cash and 
futures positions are held.  This would be expected as there is more chance for larger adverse 
price moves between the two markets. 
 For the overnight trades using the nearby futures contract, only 27% of the trades resulted 
in a profit or loss of less than 1-cent per bushel, while 61% (80%) resulted in a profit or loss of 
2.9 (4.9) cents or less per bushel.  Less than 5% of the trades show a profit or loss of 10.0 cents 
or greater.  Recall from Table 2 that for the most volatile year, 1996, two standard deviations for 
Tokyo futures was about 15 cents and for Chicago cash about 8 ½ cents.   Hence, for two 
markets quite different contract specifications, location and time of trading, the hedges would 
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appear to be modestly effective on average, but with the range of the profits and losses from 
individual hedges being quite large. 
 Continuing with the nearby TGE futures contract, the distribution for day-to-day trades is 
slightly wider and flatter than for the overnights trades with 48% (68%) showing profit or loss of 
2.9 (4.9) cents or less.  About 9% of the day-to-day trades show profits and losses greater than 10 
cents.  Finally, for two-day hedges 42% (63%) show profits or losses of 2.9 (4.9) cents or less.  
Nearly 13% of the two-day hedges show profits and losses greater than 10 cents.  This wider and 
flatter distribution of the individual hedging profits and losses for longer hedging periods is 
consistent with the larger standard deviations as shown in earlier tables. 
 The distributions for all three scenarios show that about half of the trades result in a 
trading loss while the other half result in a gain.  Thus, the hedger appears to have an even 
chance of making or losing money on a hedge, given no other information.  This would be 
expected given the short duration of the hedges. 
 The distribution of profits and losses when using the distant contract in Tokyo shows a 
very similar pattern to that for the nearby contract.  The prime difference is that the percentage of 
trades with profits and losses of 4.9 cents or less are 6 to 8 percentage points higher than those 
for the nearby contract, while the percentages in the tails beyond 5.0 cents are compensatingly 
lower.  So the distribution of individual hedging results are slightly narrower and more peaked 
when using distant TGE futures contracts as opposed to nearby contracts, a desirable trend. 
 In contrast, the distribution of e*hedging profits and losses on Project A as shown in 
Table 5 appear to be much narrower and tighter than those demonstrated for Tokyo.  Regardless 
of hedging duration, nearly 95% of all profits and losses are within 5-cents per bushel.  Clearly 
from these data, Project A provides a more attractive hedging alternative than does the corn 
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contract in Tokyo, but Project A is constrained by being a relatively thin market.  Thin markets 
are characterized by additional market-depth costs due to illiquidity when the trades are 
executed. 
 Without specific data, it is difficult to directly compare these results to the practice of 
‘taking protection’ in the cash market.  This procedure is followed only in the case of ‘overnight’ 
price protection, and we can see from Tables 2 and 3 that over the full 5-year period that two 
standard deviations from the cash mean is approximately 5-cents per bushel.  This infers that the 
downside risk premium is approximately 5 cents.  Thus, if a grain merchant were interested in 
protecting against adverse price moves, ‘taking 5 cents protection’ would on average be 
comparable to e*hedging on Project A, where 95% of profits and losses are within 5-cents per 
bushel.  However, ‘taking protection’ may be preferable to using the Tokyo market where the 
95% level of the hedging outcome distribution (Table 5) is nearer 10 cents/bushel profit or loss 
when using the Tokyo market overnight.     
 
 V.  Implications and Conclusions  
 U.S. cash corn merchants have long faced the problem of managing short-term price risks 
for grain purchased after the Chicago Board of Trade daytime futures trading closes at 1:15 p.m.  
Two alternatives now exist, e*hedging on Project A, or hedging on the corn contract traded on 
the Tokyo Grain Exchange.  This study examines three alternative hedging scenarios, overnight, 
day-to-day, and two-day hedging of these price risks on both markets.   
 The price changes between Chicago cash and Tokyo futures, as well as Project A futures, 
are positively correlated with each other and cointegrated, but none of the mean price changes is 
significantly different from zero.  There is a wide range of price movements.  Results in this 
study are not affected by alternative procedures for managing exchange rate variations. 
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 Hedging short-term price risks in Tokyo is not very effective, especially for overnight 
hedges.  Day-to-day and two-day hedges demonstrate higher correlation and R2 coefficients than 
overnight hedges, yet neither is highly effective.  Regarding the distribution of individual hedges, 
the overnight hedges have a high proportion of results with small profits and losses, but day-to-
day and two-day hedges show increasingly larger number of hedges with profits and losses 
beyond 10-cents per bushel.  Regardless of the length of the hedge, the hedger has an even 
chance of making or losing money on the hedge. 
 The overnight electronic trading on Project A overlaps with some of the hours that 
trading occurs in Tokyo.  E*hedging on Project A clearly provides a more attractive short-term 
risk-management opportunity than does the Tokyo market.  The Project A contract is the same 
contract as that traded daytime on the CBOT, giving Project A an inherent advantage over TGE.  
But the thinness of the market makes it problematic that a large commercial merchant could use 
Project A effectively due to increased costs resulting from lack of market depth.   The Tokyo 
market, which could under some definitions be considered a cross hedge for U.S. corn 
merchants, does provide a potential price risk management mechanism in a market with 
reasonable liquidity if the merchant is in the market every day.  But, contract specification 
differences could create technical problems for some merchants.  One could conclude from these 
results that Project A provides a better alternative because of its electronic trading procedure 
versus the open outcry auction in Tokyo, but more data are needed for that analysis.  
Nevertheless, overnight hedges in both markets are not very effective relative to day-to-day and 
two-day hedges, and the risk (opportunity) for fairly large profits and losses from simple hedges 
is quite high. 
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 The CBOT needs to consider various mechanisms and procedures to increase the 
volume of trading on Project A.  These could include lower commissions, expanded hours, easier 
trader access, and advertising and promotion.  Especially, the CBOT should consider electronic 
trading of corn futures contracts during all the hours that daytime open outcry trading is closed, 
covering current time gaps where no contracts are trading.  Expanded hours, however, are 
effective only if volume is also higher.  E*hedging on Project A has considerable potential in 
terms of managing short-term price risks, but the market may currently be too thin and illiquid 
for active use by large cash corn merchants. 
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 Table 1. Contract Specifications (Corn Futures) 
 
 Chicago Board of Trade Tokyo Grain Exchange 
Trading Unit 5,000 bushel 100,000 kg (3,937 bushel) 
Deliverable 
Grades 
No.2 yellow at par and substitutions 
at differentials established by the 
exchange. 
No.3 yellow corn produced in the 
U.S.A. with less than 15 % 
moisture. 
Price Quote Cents and quarter-cents/bushel Yen per 1,000 kg 
Tick Size ¼ cent/bushel ($12.50/contract) 10 yen/1,000 kg (1,000 yen per 
contract) 
Daily Price Limit 12 cents/bushel ($600/contract) 
above or below the previous day’s 
settlement price (expandable to 18 
cents/bushel). No limit in the spot 
month (limits are lifted two business 
days before the spot month begins). 
400 yen per 1,000 kg, if the 
standard price is under 15,000 yen. 
500 yen per 1,000 kg, if the 
standard price is from 15,000 yen 
to, but not including 25,000 yen. 
600 yen per 1,000 kg, if the 
standard price is from 25,000 yen 
to, but not including 35,000 yen. 
700 yen per 1,000 kg, if the 
standard price is from 35,000 yen 
and up. 
No price limits in the current 
month from the 1st day of the 
month proceeding the delivery 
month. 
Contract Months December, March, May, July, 
September 
January, March, May, July 
September and November within a 
12 month period. 
Last Trading Day 7th business day preceding the last 
business day of the delivery month. 
15th day of the month (or nearest 
business day) preceding the 
delivery month. 
Last Delivery 
Day 
Last business day of the delivery 
month. 
The last day of the delivery month. 
Trading Hours 9:30 a.m. – 1:15 p.m. central time, 
Monday-Friday Trading in expiring 
contracts closes at noon on the last 
trading day. 
Morning  
1st session 09:00-10:00 
3rd session 11:00-12:00 
Afternoon 
1st session 13:00-14:00 
3rd session 15:00-16:00 
Delivery Places 
 
Chicago, St. Louis, and  Toledo The pier of Kashima, Chiba, 
Kawasaki, and Yokohama ports. 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for the Three Hedging Scenarios  
(Chicago Cash – Nearby Tokyo Futures) 
 Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day 
1994 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 219 219 204 204 204 204 
Mean      -0.26* 0.02 -0.35 -0.40 -0.64 -0.37 
SD 1.92 3.53 3.16 5.97 3.60 7.24 
Correlation                   0.04** 0.48 0.39 
 (0.57) (7.79) (6.08) 
R2 0.0015 0.2309 0.1546 
1995 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 223 223 204 204 204 204 
Mean 0.14 -0.10 0.31 0.28 0.42 0.08 
SD 1.64 3.46 2.49 5.94 3.08 6.62 
Correlation                   0.02** 0.39 0.31 
 (0.26) (5.98) (4.69) 
R2 0.0003 0.1505 0.0982 
1996 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 194 194 170 170 170 170 
Mean 0.38 0.14 0.74 0.48 1.25 0.56 
SD 4.16 7.58 5.75 10.63 7.70 13.88 
Correlation 0.27 0.58 0.53 
 (3.93) (9.32) (8.16) 
R2 0.0743 0.341 0.2839 
1997 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 221 221 206 206 205 205 
Mean 0.22 -0.16 0.09 -0.08 0.25 -0.29 
SD 4.16 7.58 3.94 6.45 4.49 6.84 
Correlation 0.27 0.62 0.57 
 (5.79) (11.20) (9.83) 
R2 0.1329 0.3807 0.3226 
1998 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 233 233 232 232 226 226 
Mean -0.03 0.13 -0.37 -0.15 -0.51 -0.21 
SD 2.99 2.20 3.16 5.36   3.71 5.60 
Correlation 0.12 0.33 0.36 
 (1.81) (5.29) (5.74) 
R2 0.0139 0.1085 0.1282 
Total Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 1090 1090 1016 1016 1009 1009 
Mean 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.10 -0.07 
SD 2.57 4.59 3.78 6.93 4.70 8.26 
Correlation 0.22 0.51 0.47 
 (7.31) (19.03) (16.94) 
R2 0.0468 0.2632 0.2219 
*Results shown in cents per bushel.  ** Correlation coefficient is not significant.   
The numbers in parentheses are Pearson’s product-moment t-ratios.  
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics for the Three Hedging Scenarios 
(Chicago Cash – Distant Tokyo Futures) 
 Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day 
1994 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 219 219 213 213 213 213 
Mean -0.26* -0.08 -0.39 -0.30 -0.76 -0.35 
SD 1.92 3.02 3.11 5.14 3.72 5.48 
Correlation 0.24 0.64 0.49 
 (3.68) (12.17) (8.12) 
R2 0.0589 0.4125 0.238 
1995 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 223 223 214 214 215 215 
Mean 0.17 -0.03 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.36 
SD 1.72 3.50 2.46 6.21 3.29 6.72 
Correlation                  -0.02** 0.43 0.32 
 (0.24) (6.88) (4.99) 
R2 0.0003 0.1825 0.1048 
1996 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 194 194 186 186 192 192 
Mean 0.44 -0.65 0.72 -0.49 0.91 -1.00 
SD 4.07 4.92 5.75 8.06 7.71 8.24 
Correlation 0.22 0.57 0.54 
 (3.16) (9.42) (8.89) 
R2 0.0495 0.3253 0.2936 
1997 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 219 219 205 205 215 215 
Mean 0.20 0.12 0.09 -0.15 0.30 -0.10 
SD 2.44 3.59 3.96 5.64 4.57 5.73 
Correlation 0.35 0.66 0.53 
 (5.52) (12.57) (9.23) 
R2 0.1233 0.4377 0.2856 
1998 Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 235 235 225 225 226 226 
Mean 0.01 0.20 -0.42 -0.19 -0.54 -0.07 
SD 2.43 3.49 3.22 4.21 3.73 4.23 
Correlation 0.29 0.40 0.40 
 (4.55) (6.60) (6.50) 
R2 0.0816 0.1636 0.1586 
Total Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo Chicago Tokyo 
N 1090 1090 1043 1043 1061 1061 
Mean 0.10 -0.07 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.21 
SD 2.60 3.49 3.82 5.91 4.82 6.16 
Correlation 0.21 0.54 0.46 
 (7.19) (20.75) (16.97) 
R2 0.0453 0.2925 0.2137 
*Results shown in cents per bushel.  ** Correlation coefficient is not significant.   
The numbers in parentheses are Pearson’s product-moment t-ratios. 
  
21 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Summary Statistics for the Three Hedging Scenarios  
(Chicago Cash – Nearby Project A Futures) 
 
 Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day 
1996 Chicago Project A Chicago Project A Chicago Project A 
N 165 165 158 158 155 155 
Mean 0.43* 0.25 0.69 0.90 0.85 0.72 
SD 4.44 2.23 6.18 7.13 8.11 7.39 
Correlation 0.60 0.89 0.92 
 (9.53)** (24.35) (28.99) 
R2 0.358 0.7917 0.846 
1997 Chicago Project A Chicago Project A Chicago Project A 
N 204 204 217 217 218 218 
Mean 0.24 0.31 -0.05 0 0.05 0.25 
SD 2.47 1.17 4.12 4.19 4.72 4.18 
Correlation 0.51 0.86 0.81 
 (8.42) (24.81) (20.65) 
R2 0.2602 0.7411 0.6638 
1998 Chicago Project A Chicago Project A Chicago Project A 
N 244 244 240 240 238 238 
Mean -0.10 0.26 -0.39 -0.37 -0.48 -0.13 
SD 2.23 1.07 3.13 2.91 3.65 3.13 
Correlation 0.62 0.94 0.89 
 (12.27) (44.26) (29.89) 
R2 0.38 0.8917 0.7904 
Total Chicago Project A Chicago Project A Chicago Project A 
N 613 613 615 615 612 612 
Mean 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.22 
SD 3.06 1.50 4.44 4.77 5.47 4.89 
Correlation 0.58 0.89 0.89 
 (17.71) (47.94) (47.47) 
R2 0.3393 0.7895 0.787 
*Results shown in cents per bushel. 
**The numbers in parentheses are Pearson’s product-moment t-ratios. 
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Table 5. Percent of Trading Profits and Losses in One-Cent Intervals for the All Hedging Scenariosa 
    Rangeb Chicago-Nearby Tokyo Chicago-Distance Tokyo Chicago-Project A 
(cents/bu) Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day Overnight Day-to-Day Two Day 
-25.0~-29.9 0.09 0.10 0.59 0.00 0.10 0.09   
-20.0~-24.9 0.09 0.30 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.28   
-15.0~-19.9 0.28 0.89 1.19 0.18 0.19 0.19   
-10.0~-14.9 1.38 2.95 3.47 0.46 1.73 3.20 0.16 0.49 0.33
-9.0~-9.9 0.83 1.28 1.39 0.18 0.96 0.94 0.16 0.16 0.49
-8.0~-8.9 0.92 1.87 2.18 0.55 0.86 1.23 0.33 0.33 0.33
-7.0~-7.9 1.19 2.85 1.98 0.55 1.44 1.32 0.65 0.33 0.16
-6.0~-6.9 2.29 1.77 3.07 1.01 2.59 2.73 0.16 0.81 0.16
-5.0~-5.9 2.84 3.84 3.67 2.75 4.12 3.58 0.65 0.65 0.82
-4.0~-4.9 4.22 5.22 4.66 3.67 5.56 5.00 1.47 1.30 1.96
-3.0~-3.9 5.50 5.51 5.65 5.96 6.04 6.69 2.61 1.46 3.59
-2.0~-2.9 6.88 6.10 6.14 9.17 7.96 8.39 5.38 1.95 4.58
-1.0~-1.9 10.92 8.27 7.53 13.76 8.15 8.11 18.27 7.97 17.32
-0.1~-0.9 13.12 8.96 8.23 14.40 9.78 9.05 24.14 25.53 25.00
0~0.9 13.94 7.78 7.04 12.94 8.82 8.01 28.55 46.18 28.27
1.0~1.9 9.54 8.56 7.23 10.09 8.92 9.99 8.32 7.32 7.52
2.0~2.9 6.61 8.07 5.85 7.52 8.72 6.79 3.10 1.79 2.94
3.0~3.9 4.77 5.71 5.15 5.05 5.37 3.49 0.98 0.49 1.80
4.0~4.9 4.13 4.04 5.15 3.30 4.99 4.90 1.63 1.30 2.12
5.0~5.9 2.75 3.44 4.06 1.93 4.12 3.11 0.82 0.16 0.49
6.0~6.9 1.74 2.56 3.27 1.74 3.45 2.17 0.33 0.65 0.00
7.0~7.9 1.28 1.77 1.98 0.92 1.15 2.26 0.33 0.33 0.49
8.0~8.9 1.28 1.77 1.39 0.92 1.92 1.70 0.33 0.00 0.16
9.0~9.9 0.55 1.57 1.19 0.83 0.48 1.32 0.16 0.33 0.16
10.0~14.9 2.02 3.54 4.46 1.74 1.53 3.96 1.31 0.49 1.14
15.0~19.9 0.55 0.89 1.88 0.18 0.67 0.85 0.16 0.00 0.16
20.0~24.9 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.09 0.19 0.47   
25.0~29.9 0.28 0.10 0.59 0.09 0.19 0.19    
a Each column sums to 100 percent.       
b Results beyond 10 cents are combined into larger intervals due to few observations.    
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Figure 1. Chicago-Tokyo Time Line  
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